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Abstract: This paper explores the social dimensions of an experimental release of carbon dioxide 14 
(CO2) carried out in Ardmucknish Bay, Argyll, United Kingdom. The experiment, which aimed 15 
to understand detectability and potential effects on the marine environment should there be any 16 
leakage from a CO2 storage site, provided a rare opportunity to study the social aspects of a 17 
carbon dioxide capture and storage-related event taking place in a lived-in environment. 18 
Qualitative research was carried out in the form of observation at public information events 19 
about the release, in-depth interviews with key project staff and local stakeholders/community 20 
members, and a review of online media coverage of the experiment. Focusing mainly on the 21 
observation and interview data, we discuss three key findings: the role of experience and 22 
analogues in learning about unfamiliar concepts like CO2 storage; the challenge of addressing 23 
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questions of uncertainty in public engagement; and the issue of when to commence engagement 24 
and how to frame the discussion. We conclude that whilst there are clearly slippages between a 25 
small-scale experiment and full-scale CCS, the social research carried out for this project 26 
demonstrates that issues of public and stakeholder perception are as relevant for offshore CO2 27 
storage as they are for onshore. 28 
 29 
Keywords: carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS); environmental risk; environmental 30 
uncertainty; offshore energy; public engagement. 31 
 32 
Research highlights 33 
• Analysis of social dimensions of real-world CO2 release event; 34 
• Social issues as relevant for offshore CO2 storage as onshore; 35 
• Analogues helpful for publics in understanding CO2 storage; 36 
• Non-specialists can quickly grasp complex ideas and make sophisticated points; 37 





1. Introduction 41 
 42 
1.1 Background to the study 43 
 44 
In spring and summer 2012, an experimental release of carbon dioxide (CO2) was carried out in 45 
Ardmucknish Bay, Argyll, United Kingdom. The experiment was an integral part of the Natural 46 
Environment Research Council (NERC)-funded Quantifying and Monitoring Potential 47 
Ecosystem Impacts of Geological Carbon Storage (QICS) project, and sought to understand 48 
detectability and potential effects on the marine environment should there be any leakage from a 49 
CO2 storage site. Over a thirty-seven day period, CO2 was pumped into the sediments at 12 50 
metres below the seabed, 350m offshore, via a horizontally-drilled pipeline connected to a 51 
pumping station on land. Various monitoring devices were placed around the release site and 52 
observations and samples were taken before, during and after the release (for examples of 53 
research results, see Blackford and Kita (2013) and the other papers in this issue). 54 
 55 
In addition to the physico-chemical and biological science findings, the experiment also 56 
presented a rare and valuable opportunity to study the social dimensions of a real-world carbon 57 
dioxide capture and storage (CCS)-related event. With the release being conducted in a lived-in 58 
environment, public and stakeholder engagement was of the utmost importance in order to avoid 59 
potential negative reactions that could have prevented the experiment from taking place or 60 
running successfully, or at least threatened the good relationships and trust between the local 61 




SAMS co-ordinated the CO2 release experiment at the top of Ardmucknish Bay close to 64 
Benderloch village, including the installation and operation of the release facility and sampling 65 
activities (for more details about the experiment see Taylor et al (this volume)). SAMS was also 66 
responsible for acquiring the appropriate permits and consents to conduct the experiment from 67 
local- (Argyll and Bute Council, Marine and Coastal Development Unit) and government 68 
regulatory bodies (Marine Scotland and The Crown Estate), as well as from landowners 69 
(Lochnell Estates), land users (Tralee Bay Holiday Park) and non-governmental organisations. In 70 
addition to formal permissions, consent was also sought from the general public and other local 71 
stakeholder groups (e.g. local fishers) through various open meetings and public outreach 72 
activities. 73 
 74 
A public information meeting was held prior to commencement of the work in Benderloch 75 
Village Hall in early December 2011, at which the lead local scientist gave a forty-minute 76 
presentation on the rationale behind and workflow of the experiment, followed by a forty-minute 77 
question and answer session with the audience. An information stand about the project was set 78 
up at a farmers’ market day in the local village in March 2012. An ‘open day’ and a school visit 79 
were held at the release site whilst the experiment was in progress, where some of the monitoring 80 
equipment was displayed, a video of bubbles emitting from the seabed was shown, an 81 
experiment with carbonated water and litmus paper was used to demonstrate acidity, and two 82 
project scientists answered questions from visitors. Initial findings were presented at SAMS in 83 
November 2012 as part of a Winter Lecture series. During the experiment, information posters 84 
were displayed around the release site, and one of the responsibilities of the ‘on site’ scientists 85 
was to answer questions about the project from the public. Articles were run in local and later 86 
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national print and web media, the lead local scientist gave interviews on local radio and 87 
television stations, and a group was set up on social media (Facebook) giving continuous updates 88 
on the project progress to members. A central webpage (www.bgs.ac.uk/qics, accessed 89 
12/09/2014) was also created containing detailed information and images about the QICS project 90 
as a whole. 91 
 92 
1.2 Social science research on real-world CCS events 93 
 94 
Low public awareness and understanding of CCS (Eurobarometer, 2011) presents a challenge for 95 
social scientists seeking to understand the social dimensions of CCS. de Best-Waldhober et al 96 
(2009) note that in such situations of low awareness, people’s opinions are unstable and subject 97 
to change. Daamen et al (2006) refer to such opinions as ‘pseudo-opinions’, Malone et al (2010) 98 
arguing that surveying or ‘polling’ publics for opinions on CCS may be of limited value when 99 
people have not even had the opportunity to form an opinion. Even when people do receive 100 
initial information, Upham and Roberts (2011) and Howell et al (2014) find that different people 101 
change their views differently in response to learning about CCS. In some cases, people’s 102 
perceptions towards CCS can become more negative as further information is provided, Howell 103 
et al (2014) suggesting this may be because the extra information allows publics to more fully 104 
think through the uncertainties associated with CCS. 105 
 106 
One of the biggest reasons for low awareness and understanding of CCS may be the limited 107 
number of full-scale integrated CCS projects currently in operation. Nonetheless, a small body of 108 
empirical research has been done around ‘real world’ CCS, focusing mainly on pilot projects 109 
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trialling part of the CCS chain, or on proposals for future projects. What is widely acknowledged 110 
within such studies is that publics’ perceptions of CCS are highly contingent on the broader 111 
social context into which specific projects are deployed. Dütschke (2011) links the successful 112 
deployment of the CO2Sink project at Ketzin in Germany to the perception of the developer as a 113 
research organisation not standing to gain financially from the project, and Terwel et al (2012) 114 
consider how questions of trust in the developer affected publics’ responses to the Barendrecht 115 
proposals in the Netherlands. Bradbury (2012) examined community responses to six CCS 116 
project proposals in the USA, suggesting that the nature of previous community experience with 117 
large infrastructure could affect the level of support for a project. In France, Ha-Duong et al 118 
(2011) found the developer’s role as a key employer in the community, and flexibility in 119 
responding to early concerns over risk management and landscaping, to be an important factor in 120 
the ultimately successful deployment of Total’s Lacq development. 121 
 122 
The key way in which a study of the QICS project can contribute to this work is that it stands as 123 
an example of a pilot study around offshore CO2 storage. The emerging preference for offshore 124 
storage sites - in Europe at least - means building an understanding of the differences in public 125 
perception that may exist between onshore and offshore storage is vital. Exploration of public 126 
and stakeholder issues around the QICS experimental release is thus a valuable opportunity to 127 
get an early indication of some of the issues that may arise with CO2 storage in a marine 128 
environment. 129 
 130 




Social science research around the QICS project was carried out under a wider programme of 133 
work being undertaken in Scotland, north England and Italy by the public perceptions work 134 
package of the EU FP7-funded ECO2 project (www.eco2-project.eu, accessed 15/09/2014). A 135 
Memorandum of Understanding between ECO2 and QICS allowed ECO2 researchers to observe 136 
some public engagement activities being carried out around the release site, with the results 137 
feeding in to the ECO2 social science work package (for example Mabon et al, 2014; Mabon and 138 
Shackley, 2014). 139 
 140 
The research design for the QICS social science study was to a certain extent determined by the 141 
nature of the project as a whole. The experimental release was inherently controversial in that it 142 
could be viewed as deliberate, albeit well planned and controlled, pollution of a high-quality 143 
marine environment. The experiment was both technologically risky, nothing similar having 144 
been attempted previously, and involved significant expense in engineering a gas delivery 145 
pipeline from shore to the release point 350m off-shore at 12m depth in the sediment. There is 146 
already a precedent of environmental groups opposing open ocean iron fertilisation experiments, 147 
which has contributed to the abandonment of expensive scientific projects (Mayo-Ramsay, 2012). 148 
For QICS, there was thus motivation not only to minimise risk of experimental failure, but also 149 
to communicate effectively and transparently so that bodies and individuals could make an 150 
informed decision and/or allow the project to take account of any local issues that might require 151 
some modification of the experimental plan. To this end, in addition to obtaining formal 152 
permission for the CO2 release from the relevant regulatory bodies, the project took a considered 153 
and early decision to go beyond these formal legal obligations and consult with a wide range of 154 
potentially affected bodies and individuals, mainly at the local level. Accordingly, QICS 155 
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developed a locally-centred communications strategy, consulting regional government, 156 
environmental groups, marine users and the public. In order to allow any concerns among the 157 
community and local stakeholders to be identified and suitably addressed before they became 158 
distorted or amplified by other spatially distant actors, national publicity was deliberately left 159 
until after all local issues had been considered. 160 
 161 
Given these potential sensitivities, it was crucial (especially at the early stages of the project) not 162 
to give local citizens the impression that they were being observed to study how they would react 163 
to the proposals in order to trial out publicity and marketing strategies for deployment of 164 
commercial CCS elsewhere, as if they too were part of an ‘experiment’. Additionally, the aim of 165 
forming an in-depth understanding of why people expressed particular perceptions – and the 166 
associated need to probe participants and data further on occasion - meant that a qualitative 167 
approach was more suitable. Taking both of these factors into account, the first phase of social 168 
research involved passive observation at two specific QICS public engagement events – the 169 
public information meeting held in Benderloch village hall close to the release site in December 170 
2011; and the ‘open day’ held at the release site in May 2012. ECO2 social scientists attended 171 
both these events, observed the questions publics and stakeholders asked the presenting scientists, 172 
and wrote up detailed field notes based on their observations. The public information meeting 173 
was also video recorded (with the camera pointing at the presenting scientists), and transcribed. 174 
 175 
Following the completion of the main part of the experimental CO2 release, in-depth interviews 176 
were carried out with key SAMS staff involved in the project, and with local stakeholders and 177 
community members aware of the experiment (see Table 1 for further details). Seven such 178 
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interviews were conducted, however given the aim of examining in depth the contextual factors 179 
driving perceptions of offshore CO2 storage, the quality and content of the interviews was 180 
deemed more important than the size or statistical representativeness of the sample. Chase 181 
(2005:667) notes that “any narrative is significant because it embodies – and gives us insight into 182 
– what is possible and intelligible within a specific social context.” It was hence deemed possible 183 
to get sufficient analytical purchase on the context of the QICS release by working intensively 184 
with a few key locally-based respondents who had a close relationship to the experiment (see 185 
Table 1), as they would be well placed to give insight into the wider social context of the QICS 186 
release due to their in-depth understanding of how the project had developed over time. In any 187 
case, the small local population would have made the construction of a representative sample 188 
difficult. The interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. These formal interviews were 189 
supplemented with informal, unrecorded conversations held with members of the general public 190 
at a farmers’ market close to the release site, at which one of the ECO2 social researchers had a 191 
stall with basic information about the experimental CO2 release and the ECO2 project. The aim 192 
of setting the stall up was to find out people’s perceptions at an informal level, whilst continuing 193 
the project’s community presence. By and large (with the exception of one member of the public 194 
who expressed particular interest in energy and environmental issues, and agreed to take part in a 195 
longer interview whilst visiting the stall), publics spoken to in informal conversations showed 196 
some interest in but little concern over the experiment, usually admitting to low awareness of 197 
CO2 storage and CCS more widely (we discuss the implications of this at the start of Section 3.2). 198 
 199 








Female Responsible for liaising with media 
and local community about all 
SAMS’ activities. 
Identified as key SAMS 
member – responsible for 
communications. 
Farm manager Female Farm manager close to experiment 
site, also key figure in community 
sustainability group. 
Identified through initial 
media analysis as key 
environmental 
stakeholder in area. 
Journalist at 
local newspaper 
Male Reporting on local news, including 
the QICS release. 
Identified through initial 
media analysis as key 
source of media 




Male Lives close to sea, occasional sailor 
in experiment bay. 
Opportunistic sampling 
at farmers’ market based 
on expression of interest. 
Professor 
(SAMS) 
Male Senior figure in SAMS, oversees 
research in institute and acts as 
public ‘face’ for activities. 
Identified as key SAMS 
member – overarching 





Male Working on QICS project as part of 
research programme. 
Identified as key SAMS 








Male Chief local scientist for QICS 
experiment. 
Initial point of contact 
for social scientists 
planning research on 
QICS. 
 202 
Finally, articles published on online news sites about the experiment were read (both editorial 203 
content and reader comments) as a means of providing additional contextual information. These 204 
articles were used initially to help identify key stakeholders to interview, and were then reviewed 205 
after the analysis of the in-depth interviews and qualitative observations were completed as a 206 
means of checking whether the themes emerging in the small-scale data set were representative 207 
of wider thinking within the community and beyond. The key themes emerging from the 208 
interviews and observations mapped well onto the concepts raised in online articles – in 209 
particular the contextualisation of risk and the use of analogues to understand unfamiliar 210 
concepts. As these online sources were used mainly as a cross-check for the other data in the 211 
study and offered little extra in the way of thematic content, in the interests of space this paper 212 
will focus on the interview and ethnographic observations in order to explore these as fully as 213 
possible within the space available. 214 
 215 
Topics of energy and environmental change can elicit strong and emotive responses (Cass and 216 
Walker, 2009). With this can come the risk of researchers – perhaps unconsciously – ‘cherry 217 
picking’ the most exciting or contentious quotes for further investigation (Mabon et al, 2014), 218 
even if these do not necessarily represent the views of the wider community. Data analysis was 219 
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therefore based on an adapted version of the Doucet and Mauthner (2008) ‘listening guide’. This 220 
entailed reading the interview and meeting transcripts four times – once for the researcher’s own 221 
initial responses; once for the way the speaker talks about themselves; once for identifying how 222 
the speaker talks about relationships; and once for the wider themes the speaker raises. The aim 223 
was to acknowledge that the researcher’s own interests and values can affect the way qualitative 224 
data is processed, and to try to separate this out from what participants themselves said. The field 225 
notes and online media were then read in light of the emergent themes, looking for additional 226 
topics or additional nuances. The results discussed below reflect the themes that emerged most 227 
clearly from the whole analysis process. 228 
 229 
3. Results and implications for CCS 230 
 231 
3.1 How people learn – experience and analogues 232 
 233 
The first theme emerging from the study concerns how people learn about CO2 storage, climate 234 
change, and the environment around them. It became apparent during both the public 235 
engagement sessions and interviews that whilst both publics and stakeholders can remember 236 
some things well, they may remember other things in a vague, superficial or partial way: 237 
 238 
I was aware, certainly in Asia there were a few trials […] And I think as well I’d heard about 239 
earthquakes etc, I think in America if I remember correctly, and also England as well from 240 




There has been experiments that you intend to carry out, there has been these done already, isn’t 243 
there? […] in America they tested inland, there, do it there and actually contaminate fresh water 244 
to the point that humans couldn’t drink it. (participant, public meeting, December 2011) 245 
 246 
From the data available to the authors, it cannot be ascertained with certainty whether or not the 247 
events the speakers describe above actually relate to CO2 storage. Given the timing of the public 248 
information meeting, it is likely the second speaker is referring to the leakage allegations at the 249 
Weyburn-Midale project in Saskatchewan, Canada, in which a local farming couple situated on 250 
the perimeter of the injection area made allegations of excessive CO2 levels, abnormal plant 251 
growth and animal mortalities on their land. Investigations subsequently found that the high CO2 252 
levels were real, but because they were seasonal, and related to rainfall in the area were most 253 
likely biogenic in origin and not associated with the injected CO2 (Beaubien et al, 2013). The 254 
allegations received some headline media coverage, but the refutations did not make such 255 
extensive headlines (Boyd et al, 2013). However, there is also a chance that both speakers are 256 
confusing CO2 storage with the well-documented controversies around hydraulic fracturing in 257 
the USA and UK. Regardless, the fact remains that things the speakers recall seeing or hearing 258 
elsewhere inform their initial perceptions of CCS, even if they cannot remember specific details. 259 
In the case of the second speaker, this prior understanding pre-dispositions him to be more 260 
cautious towards the whole idea of CO2 storage, and thus towards the experimental release. 261 
Whilst the second speaker explicitly refers to an ‘inland’ experiment in the USA (note also that 262 
Weyburn-Midale is in fact situated in Canada), he carries this concern over to an offshore 263 
experiment in the UK – suggesting that perceptions of risks people understand from onshore 264 




Even when publics did fully understand the underpinning science behind the experiment, 267 
personal understandings and experiences of the local environment in some cases contributed to a 268 
more cautious stance towards offshore CO2 storage – if not to the local experiment itself (we 269 
explore this distinction between the experiment and CCS as a climate change mitigation 270 
technology more fully in Section 4). As a farm manager with a background in biological science 271 
explained: 272 
 273 
The full concept of the bigger, the big scale version, it would be better if we could reduce the 274 
amount of CO2 we were doing rather than, you know, finding unusual places to dump it! I have, 275 
I still have my doubts about whether that’s as well thought through as it could be, glad it’s the 276 
North Sea and not on the west coast but it’s still a bit too close. You know, we have, we have 277 
interesting earthquakes in this part of the world on occasions, because, well because we’re at the 278 
bottom of the Great Glen, so anything that messes about with the- Well that’s the point you see, 279 
is, geology’s not just local, in fact geology’s almost never local, geology does work rather, over 280 
rather large distances, so, so yes messing about with one bit would go, can have repercussions 281 
for the rest of us. (interview with farm manager, near Oban, October 2012) 282 
 283 
Here, experience of small earthquakes in the locale are used as a starting point for the 284 
interviewee - who explained earlier on in the interview she had a background in biological 285 
science - to think about the complexity of geology. Concepts such as tectonic plates are drawn in 286 
to argue that even something happening across a great spatial distance could have localised 287 
implications for communities. The use of the phrase ‘messing about’ perhaps also implies the 288 
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limitations of human knowledge (see Section 3.2), and the potential for unknown or unexpected 289 
effects to arise from sub-seabed CO2 storage. Additionally, this stands as another example of a 290 
situation where experiences or understandings of activities taking place onshore can affect 291 
perceptions of activities taking place ‘far away’ and offshore. Offshore activities like sub-seabed 292 
CO2 storage are not necessarily perceived as being less risky because they are taking place out at 293 
sea, rather people may use more familiar ‘on land’ understandings to conceptualise what could 294 
go wrong and how it could affect them.  295 
 296 
Conversely, personal and embodied experience can help publics to understand new and complex 297 
phenomena. Another attendee at the initial public information meeting rationalised the small 298 
scale of the experimental release thus: 299 
 300 
Another parallel might be the discharge of septic tanks into Ardmucknish Bay, which has been 301 
going on for, well, as long as we’ve been discharging urine and faeces into Ardmucknish Bay. 302 
That presumably, I mean, I see urea mentioned there bringing down the pH […] we’ve been able 303 
to swim near to a sewage outcrop for many years without hitting the worst of the rubbish, so it’s 304 
no big a problem, is it? (participant, public meeting, December 2011) 305 
 306 
The participant’s own understanding of the environment in which he lives helps him to 307 
understand how small quantities of ‘pollutants’ released into a relatively healthy marine 308 
environment need not have disastrous consequences for humans living nearby. Visitors to the 309 
open afternoon at the release site made a similar point, suggesting that the environmental impacts 310 
from effluent released by a nearby caravan site could be greater than those from the experimental 311 
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CO2 release. In both cases, analogues are used to compare the unfamiliar concept of CO2 storage 312 
to what is known locally. There is thus the possibility that small-scale, localised ‘pollution’ 313 
(rather than more scientific discourses around climate change) can be used as an analogue to help 314 
publics and stakeholders understand that CO2 storage takes place against a much wider backdrop 315 
of humans having effects on the marine environments around them. 316 
 317 
A key implication of all of this for engaging with publics and stakeholders on CCS is that 318 
people’s understandings and perceptions of new phenomena are based very much on their ability 319 
to find appropriate analogues, primarily from direct experiences of the environments around 320 
them but also from media coverage and/or wider public discussions about energy and 321 
environmental change. This fits well with Gigerenzer’s (2008) advocacy for the use of analogues 322 
as powerful heuristics, since they allow someone to make rapid progress in identifying and 323 
characterising a ‘new thing’ by reference to something more familiar. Likewise, Riesch (2012) 324 
discusses Moscovici’s work on social representations of risk, suggesting that new and abstract 325 
concepts  are conceptually anchored to topics that are already understood and made sense of via 326 
associated reasoning. From a cognitive psychology perspective, Palmgren et al (2004) suggest a 327 
‘mental models’ approach can demonstrate how understandings of new phenomena relate to 328 
people’s wider beliefs. In short, the idea of CCS being evaluated in relation to previous 329 
experiences people have had fits well with thinking across a range of social theories. 330 
 331 
People may of course come to understand things in a partial and piecemeal way, remembering 332 
some things well but mis-remembering or mis-interpreting others. Equally, however, experiences 333 
of processes like earthquakes and environmental pollution can help people to contextualise the 334 
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potential risks and benefits of an unfamiliar new technology like CO2 storage. As such, rather 335 
than ‘starting from scratch’ with a narrative of climate change and the need for CO2 emission 336 
cuts that assumes limited public knowledge, an alternative starting point for public and 337 
stakeholder engagement on CCS may be to have a discussion about how people experience 338 
environmental change around them more generally, and situate CO2 storage within this much 339 
larger picture of human and natural activities driving change in the marine environment. It is 340 
important to register, though, that this rationale still rests upon the understanding that CO2 is 341 
somehow problematic and that carbon reduction is necessary. 342 
 343 
3.2 Dealing with uncertainty and risk 344 
 345 
The second emergent theme relates to how publics (and local stakeholders) evaluate questions of 346 
uncertainty and risk. Carr et al (2013) argue in the context of climate engineering that the public 347 
are ready for discussions of high technical, moral and ethical complexity, and can participate in 348 
such discussions without a huge amount of scientific information. This certainly seemed to be 349 
the case for the community members engaging with the experimental CO2 release in 350 
Ardmucknish Bay. Consider some of the questions asked by audience members at the public 351 
information evening following a presentation on the experiment by the lead scientist: 352 
 353 
[I]n ecological terms it’s impossible to ever scale up, because the reactions are all so completely 354 
different. Is this caprock the same as what we have in Ardmucknish Bay? I mean this looks like, 355 
what you’re looking at under, you know, the North Sea is your deep sea, large empty wells or 356 




What’s to stop [storage formation] water absorbing the CO2 and then coming out? Because the 359 
water presumably displaces when it goes somewhere, and what’s to stop that water absorbing 360 
the CO2 and going out as it wishes? 361 
 362 
[Y]our presentation appears to be maybe four or five things that are quite key to dealing with 363 
people’s perceptions, you know the small scale, short-term experiment, a minimal area being 364 
affected, small quantities of CO2 being released and what is the, you know, the equivalent in real 365 
life etc. 366 
 367 
(participants, public meeting, December 2011) 368 
 369 
One of course has to bear in mind the possibility that community members willing to attend a 370 
public information talk – and asking questions thereafter – could well be more scientifically 371 
engaged than the community at large. Indeed, members of the public spoken to informally at the 372 
farmers’ market appeared somewhat interested in but generally unconcerned by the experiment, 373 
often professing to having low awareness of the concept of CO2 storage. This relates to the 374 
suggestion of Howell et al (2014) that as knowledge of CCS and related processes increases, so 375 
too can perception of potential risks and uncertainties – hence it may be the case that those 376 
attending the meeting were more engaged and informed than ‘average’ or lay members of the 377 
public, and thus more likely to perceive shortcomings or limitations. Many of these questions 378 
may also have come from those who were attending the evening in a semi-professional role as 379 
stakeholders. However, these quotes still stand as a good illustration of two related issues: how 380 
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publics and stakeholders conceive of uncertainty in science; and how they come to interpret the 381 
risks of CO2 storage more specifically. 382 
 383 
In terms of uncertainty in science more broadly, the first participant’s questioning of the wider 384 
relevance of the release reflects very well Wynne’s (1992) observation on how technical risk 385 
assessment is ‘extended’ beyond a limited context and assumed to have relevance more widely. 386 
What was especially interesting about the QICS release was that, because of the experimental 387 
nature of the work and the huge timescales involved with full-scale CO2 storage, project 388 
scientists were sometimes unable to give straight and unequivocal answers to questions posed by 389 
the public: 390 
 391 
[I]n any research project you do not know one hundred percent what the outcome is going to be. 392 
So you put something in the environment that you think is safe, that will not have a long-term 393 
implication, what if you’re wrong and you do have a long-term implication, what are you going 394 
to do about it then? […] So that I think was a genuine open question that we just couldn’t 395 
answer, and that nobody can, and that is a matter of research.[…] I mean we would, I think our 396 
main, main answer was then to look at the amount of gas we were going to release and how 397 
small it was. (interview with communications officer, SAMS, October 2012) 398 
 399 
Uncertainty here is conceived of as an integral and inevitable part of scientific enquiry. The 400 
nature of research and experimentation is such that the outcomes cannot be determined 401 
beforehand – however, through existing knowledge, understanding and experience it is possible 402 
to get a sense of the parameters within which the outcome of this ‘experiment’ will be located. 403 
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Nonetheless, this conception of uncertainty in science – and an experiment as a controlled way of 404 
refining existing knowledge - had potential to run up against alternative views of 405 
experimentation and uncertainty. This bigger issue of uncertainty on occasion manifested itself 406 
in the form of more specific concerns over the environmental risks of CO2 storage and the 407 
experimental release: 408 
 409 
You can’t guarantee it’s not going to stay within that 200 metres, the effects, what are the effects 410 
if it does come onto the beach? […] I happen to know three or four folk who do fish in the area 411 
all the time, and there is a lot of people who visit, divers go to the marina etc, and I would say 412 
that’s a massive recreational area, and it’s a fishing area, and basically, potentially, and you 413 
can’t answer the question is how much damage could that do in that short period of time? 414 
(participant, public meeting, December 2011) 415 
 416 
In this case, the member of the public takes the notion of uncertainty and the need for 417 
experimentation, and translates it into the possibility that absolutely anything could happen as a 418 
result of CO2 being released into Ardmucknish Bay. People thinking in this way about risks 419 
specifically associated with the QICS release were in the minority, however the project scientists 420 
(and some more supportive publics) responded to concerns of this type mainly by putting the size 421 
and scale of the experiment into a wider context – as with the communications officer 422 
emphasising the small volume of gas being released. Two scientists present at the open day at the 423 
release site likewise related the controlled CO2 release to the much larger and uncontrolled 424 
‘experiment’ humans are doing on a daily basis by releasing vast quantities of CO2 into the 425 
environment through the consumption of fossil fuels. The scientists also used a ‘Soda Stream’ 426 
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machine to inject CO2 into drinking water, thus creating carbonated water of the kind drunk on a 427 
daily basis and illustrating that CO2 in water was not necessarily harmful to humans. 428 
 429 
As for what this says for CCS communication and engagement, it illustrates a much bigger issue 430 
over communicating uncertainties. As some of the extracts above indicate, more than 431 
reassurances that a CO2 storage site will not leak (or that site operators know exactly what will 432 
happen), what publics and stakeholders want is to see that researchers and developers have given 433 
adequate thought to the limitations of their knowledge, and that adequate monitoring and 434 
remediation procedures are in place should any unexpected event like a leak of CO2 occur (Scott 435 
et al, 2014). This is closely linked with the concept of ‘resilience’ in risk management, where 436 
‘success’ can be viewerd as the ability of organisations, groups and individuals to anticipate the 437 
complexity of the real world before failures and harm occur (Hollnagel et al, 2006). Fitting with 438 
the responsible innovation agenda proposed by Stilgoe et al (2013), there is thus the importance 439 
of building anticipatory capability into projects by asking and taking seriously ‘what if’ 440 
questions, bringing a range of knowledges and experiences into project development at as early a 441 
stage as possible. By starting from the premise of what would happen were a sub-seabed CO2 442 
storage site to leak, the QICS experiment itself could even be seen as an example of building this 443 
kind of anticipatory capability. 444 
 445 
3.3 When and how to engage? 446 
 447 
The final emergent theme concerns the timing and framing of engagement. One of the lead 448 




[T]he problem is, what do you start with? It’s a little bit like the chicken and the egg! Before we 451 
knew we had a site where we actually had to get permission from the land owner, we had to do 452 
all the surveys before and then say okay we’ve got a couple of sites, and then before asking the 453 
public if, I mean some might have said that we should have gone out and asked the public first, 454 
what do you think about this? But then we just realised this is going to take far too much time, 455 
and there are just so many, so we thought at first it was best to just find a site, and get 456 
permission from the landowner, and the end user, and then engaged the local community in that 457 
area and work in that way. (interview with research scientist, QICS project, October 2012) 458 
 459 
The project management decided on balance that selecting one site with agreement of land 460 
owners and relevant authorities, and only then engaging the wider community, was the only 461 
economical and practicable approach when compared to sounding out eight or nine different 462 
communities at potential sites. With necessary consents from land owners/users and regulatory 463 
bodies, the public information evening thus served the purpose of informing the local community 464 
about what would be happening rather than seeking their consent. This elicited surprise from 465 
several (but not all) people at the information meeting: 466 
 467 
Is it not nice to ask folk rather than just saying by the way, coming here tonight, this thing’s 468 
happening and you’re paying for this thing? You know, it’s not, like, it’s like me telling you that I 469 
don’t agree with totally, and I don’t have all the facts about it tonight, and I just feel like you’ve 470 
turned up here, and you’ve said this is what’s happening, you can object as much as you like, but 471 




This concern over activities being a ‘done deal’ – perhaps aided by the way in which the 474 
workflow of the QICS release inevitably had to be presented as imminent and definitely going 475 
ahead - is mirrored in other CCS-related social science research, where publics have expressed 476 
discomfort over the way in which decisions about the environments around them are made 477 
without their consultation or consent. In work carried out for the EU FP7 SiteChar project in 478 
north-east Scotland, it was this perception that a decision had already been taken to proceed with 479 
CO2 storage that concerned some participants, even though the proposed storage site was far out 480 
at sea and not on the land under people’s homes (Brunsting et al, 2012; Mabon and Shackley, 481 
2014). This suggests that the concerns publics can have about CCS-related developments being 482 
forced on them from on high may not necessarily relate to worries about exposure to immediate 483 
technical and scientific risks, but rather dissatisfaction with the process through which decisions 484 
about places meaningful to them are made. The value of process in reaching outcomes amenable 485 
to all is likewise understood as part of the basic guidelines of consensus building and alternative 486 
dispute resolution (Susskind and Crukishank, 2006). An implication of this for governance of 487 
sub-seabed CO2 storage sites is that it should not be assumed the potential for public concern 488 
will be reduced by increasing the physical distance between storage sites and centres of 489 
population, as bigger questions about process, justice and ‘ownership’ of environments may arise 490 
(Mackinnon and Brennan, 2012). 491 
 492 
Nonetheless, the dilemma faced by the experiment organisers – a limited number of sites with 493 
the right physical characteristics, and restrictions on time and resources to carry out public 494 
engagement activities - somewhat mirrors the conditions that will affect full-scale CCS 495 
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deployment. Storage sites will initially be identified largely by geological suitability as opposed 496 
to ‘social fit’, and the locations of existing power stations, pipelines and associated infrastructure 497 
may constrain the flexibility of deployment. Further, whilst more deliberative processes bringing 498 
in a range of perspectives at an early stage are certainly desirable, it may be the case that 499 
decisions about renewing energy systems and mitigating climate change do ultimately have to be 500 
taken, and that some people may not be happy with these. Under such conditions, strategies for 501 
reducing the potential for opposition may include being clear from the outset about what can and 502 
cannot be achieved through participation in engagement. The QICS experiment organisers also 503 
expanded their communications strategy in response to feedback from community members, 504 
taking part in a radio interview, having a presence at a farmers’ market, and feeding back initial 505 
results to the community through a free public lecture organised soon after the conclusion of the 506 
experiment. 507 
 508 
Another related issue pertains to the framing of the experimental release, and of CCS more 509 
generally. Many publics attending the engagement events organised by SAMS – and many 510 
people posting comments to news articles – viewed the experiment as a piece of ‘science’ rather 511 
than a trial of energy technology. SAMS staff involved in the experiment situated the QICS 512 
release in this context of scientific endeavour: 513 
 514 
I think there’s a huge degree of confidence developing about our operation. People feel it’s to 515 
their benefit so we get a lot of public support. So when we propose something we’re not seen as 516 
coming from some distant planet and doing something terribly suspicious, we’re probably seen 517 
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as a bunch of scientists who are wanting to achieve something new, which as a starting position 518 
is not bad! (interview with professor, SAMS, October 2012) 519 
 520 
[M]ost people, whether, whether they necessarily think CCS is a good thing or a bad thing is less 521 
relevant, they’re more curious to find out what we are, what results we’re going to get. I mean, 522 
different people are approaching it from very different directions, but once we explain all we’re 523 
doing is generating the results, analysing the results, and interpreting them, then they’re actually 524 
very curious to find out what the results are going to be. (interview with researcher, SAMS, 525 
October 2012) 526 
 527 
The primary focus on the QICS release as a piece of scientific research – with decisions about its 528 
implications for the viability of CO2 storage being made elsewhere – seemed to garner support 529 
from most residents and stakeholders. The emphasis on building knowledge to allow developers 530 
and policy makers to make an informed decision about CO2 storage and CCS (the word 531 
‘evidence’ appeared frequently in interview transcripts) perhaps helped to side-step the range of 532 
views within the community on whether or not full-scale CCS was a ‘good thing’. Linking back 533 
to the points made in Section 3.1, additional strategies used by scientists at both the public 534 
information evening and the open day to rationalise the experiment – in many cases suggested by 535 
publics and stakeholders themselves – centered around the release as just one of many human 536 
impacts affecting the marine ecosystem of the bay, and the very small size of the experiment 537 
compared to some of these other emission sources. In particular, the samples of monitoring 538 
equipment on display at the open day, and the use of experiments with carbonated water to 539 
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contextualise the scale of the release, seemed to keep to the fore this idea of QICS as a small-540 
scale scientific endeavour. 541 
 542 
The QICS experimental release offers some suggestions as to how to widen out the discussion on 543 
CCS. The commonly used narrative in CCS communication is one of the need for deep cuts in 544 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions to avert dangerous climate change, with CCS being the only 545 
realistic way to deliver this in the time frame available (Mabon and Shackley, 2014). However, 546 
this is problematic for those who may never accept the anthropogenic climate change argument, 547 
and for those who may not view large-scale fossil fuel infrastructure as a fitting solution in any 548 
case. The framing of CO2 not as a greenhouse gas but more generally as a pollutant that needs to 549 
be controlled is one possibility in this regard, and has already proven successful with the Decatur 550 
project in the USA (Ibarolla et al, 2012). Particularly with offshore projects where the marine 551 
environment is already a focus of discussion, it may be possible to couch the need to reduce the 552 
amount of atmospheric CO2 in terms of a drive to mitigate ocean acidification – indeed, a 553 
discussion on water acidity formed part of the scientists’ presentations at the release site ‘open 554 
day’. A focus on building the evidence base for assessing viability of storage may also prove 555 
helpful with early projects, and could even be tied into reasons other than energy production for 556 
why CO2 may need to be ‘stored’, such as emissions from industrial sources. 557 
 558 
4. Cautions – what might the QICS release not tell us about CCS and society? 559 
 560 
Whilst we have aimed above to sketch out some areas in which the QICS experimental release 561 
might contribute to the body of research on public perceptions of real-world CCS-related project, 562 
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it is important to acknowledge the limitations of our findings. Although the CO2 release did 563 
involve interaction with other activities in a populated, working marine environment, it was 564 
ultimately a small-scale scientific experiment. In addition to having a long-standing reputation 565 
for producing quality scientific research, SAMS is one of the biggest employers in the Argyll 566 
area, especially in the communities around which the release took place. About 160 people are 567 
employed locally at the organisation’s Scottish Marine Institute (SAMS, 2014). Many 568 
researchers themselves live in these communities (indeed, the institute director commented at the 569 
end of the first public information meeting that his own house overlooked the bay in which the 570 
release would take place), and the familiarity of the communities with the scientists carrying out 571 
the research may have contributed to the generally high levels of support and trust. Whilst it was 572 
not possible to conduct a ‘baseline’ analysis of public perception before the experiment due to 573 
potential sensitivities within the community and the concern with not jeopardising the physical 574 
science research that had been planned in advance, it is true that SAMS has conducted large-575 
scale research in the local marine environment previously. An example of this is the installation 576 
of an artificial reef system (Sayer and Wilding, 2002), hence there is already precedent for 577 
activities similar to the QICS release being carried out in the community to broad support. 578 
Whether an external developer coming in to the area without these relationships would have been 579 
able to carry out a similar piece of work is open to question. 580 
 581 
Public support for a piece of scientific research may also not equal support for full-scale 582 
commercial CCS. A number of people did make their scepticism about CCS known during the 583 
engagement events and interviews, even if they could understand the need to generate a strong 584 
evidence base to allow decisions to be made about CO2 storage. The extent to which findings 585 
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from experimental and pilot studies like these can be transferred to projects being operated for 586 
profit by private developers thus ought to be examined further. On the other hand, comments 587 
from publics during the engagement events, and also on from other CCS social research projects 588 
(Mabon and Shackley, 2014), suggest publics do not necessarily view science as ‘objective’ and 589 
impartial and can be suspicious about the effects of science funding sources on results. 590 
 591 
When applying the lessons of experiments like QICS to commercial CCS-related trials, it is also 592 
important to note potential limitations to framing CCS as ‘pollution control’. Stressing the 593 
control of pollution when the key aim is still to produce electricity could be seen as an example 594 
of Schwarz and Thompson’s (1990) ‘stolen rhetoric’, which could back-fire if publics and 595 
stakeholders already sceptical towards the development get a sense they are being lied to or told 596 
half-truths about the real purpose of CCS. As outlined earlier, the conceptualisation of CO2 as 597 
pollution does still rely on people believing that CO2, or pollution generally, is a problem for 598 
them. 599 
 600 
5. Conclusions 601 
 602 
The QICS experimental CO2 release provided a valuable opportunity to study public and 603 
stakeholder responses to a CO2 storage-related event taking place not on paper or in the 604 
laboratory, but in an inhabited and working environment. Of perhaps more importance than 605 
whether the local communities ultimately thought the experiment was a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing 606 
was building an understanding of what the factors are that drive perception of sub-seabed CO2 607 
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storage, and also getting a sense of where the possible gaps and slippages might lie in going from 608 
a small-scale science ‘experiment’ to a large-scale commercial development. 609 
 610 
The first main finding is that people do not enter engagement processes like these with no a 611 
priori knowledge of energy or environmental change. Rather, they bring with them knowledge 612 
gained from experiences of living (and sometimes working) in environments around them, 613 
learning in embodied, ad hoc and occasionally piecemeal ways. As a result, things may be mis-614 
remembered or mis-understood in a way that leads to a very cautious stance to things like CO2 615 
storage, but equally these experiences can help people to contextualise and rationalise otherwise 616 
obscure and opaque ideas. In any case, all of this demonstrates the value for project operators in 617 
tapping in to analogues to more familiar processes as a means of opening up a discussion on a 618 
new and unfamiliar concept like CO2 storage. 619 
 620 
The second main finding relates to dealing with uncertainty. Although awareness of CCS 621 
remains low among the general public, this does not mean that people cannot quickly grasp new 622 
ideas and ask complex and in-depth questions. Some of the points raised in the information 623 
meetings and interviews by stakeholders and informed publics serve only to reiterate the idea 624 
that people do not want to be told by researchers and developers that CO2 storage sites will never 625 
leak, rather that adequate procedures are in place if there is a leak and that sufficient attention has 626 
been given to ‘worst case’ scenarios. QICS as a whole project may have a key role to play in 627 
building such knowledge of what would happen should a sub-seabed storage site for whatever 628 




The third main finding concerns how and when to engage. The dilemma around early 631 
engagement for the Ardmucknish CO2 release exemplifies well the tension between wanting to 632 
have a full, fair and open deliberation process on one hand, versus the harsh reality of needing to 633 
avoid paralysis and make decisions within a certain time frame and budget on the other. 634 
Managing expectations from an early stage, having flexibility in governance processes, and 635 
feeding back results to the community can be helpful in this regard. Although maybe excessive 636 
for a project on the scale of QICS, the ‘stage gating’ approach developed by Stilgoe et al (2013) 637 
might be useful for larger projects, bringing in publics and stakeholders at key decision points 638 
during the project planning and execution. The QICS release has also illustrated some alternative 639 
ways in which CO2 storage can be framed (at the research and development stage at least), for 640 
example the need to create an evidence base and the concept of CO2 as a general pollutant. 641 
 642 
We finish with an observation on perceptions of offshore versus onshore storage. There is ample 643 
evidence in this study to call into question assumptions that offshore CO2 storage will always be 644 
‘easier’ from a public acceptance perspective. The marine environment can be a major source of 645 
employment and income for coastal communities like those in Argyll, so anything perceived as 646 
affecting this marine environment may be viewed as exposing coastal communities to risk – 647 
albeit risk to livelihood and valued biological diversity instead of the techno-scientific risk 648 
usually associated with onshore storage. Furthermore, a number of participants in this study used 649 
their knowledge of physical processes on land to envision what the risks of offshore storage 650 
might be, and did not always see physical distance as insulating them from problems like 651 
groundwater contamination or induced seismicity. Finally, concern over how decisions are taken 652 
about what happens in and under waters shows that publics’ place values and attachments can 653 
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easily extend beyond land to include the sea and seabed. If nothing else, this social study into the 654 
QICS release has illustrated that issues of public and stakeholder perception are just as relevant 655 
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